Emerging I&C Technologies Under the Shifting Regulatory Environment in South Korea by Gyunyoung Heo et al.
REVIEW
published: 29 April 2015
doi: 10.3389/fenrg.2015.00019
Edited by:
Muhammad Zubair,
University of Engineering and
Technology, Pakistan
Reviewed by:
Wei Zhou,
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, USA
Jonghyun Kim,
KEPCO International Nuclear
Graduate School, South Korea
*Correspondence:
Hyun Gook Kang,
Department of Nuclear and Quantum
Engineering, Korea Advanced Institute
of Science and Technology, 291
Daehak-ro, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon
305-701, South Korea
hyungook@kaist.ac.kr
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to Nuclear
Energy, a section of the journal
Frontiers in Energy Research
Received: 09 March 2015
Accepted: 09 April 2015
Published: 29 April 2015
Citation:
Heo G, Seong PH and Kang HG
(2015) Emerging I&C technologies
under the shifting regulatory
environment in South Korea.
Front. Energy Res. 3:19.
doi: 10.3389/fenrg.2015.00019
Emerging I&C technologies under the
shifting regulatory environment in
South Korea
Gyunyoung Heo 1, Poong Hyun Seong 2 and Hyun Gook Kang 2*
1 Department of Nuclear Engineering, Kyung Hee University, Youngin-si, South Korea, 2 Department of Nuclear and Quantum
Engineering, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon, South Korea
The role of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has been supplementary and risk-
informed applications based on the insight from PSA have also been utilized limitedly
in the licensing process for nuclear power plants (NPPs) in South Korea. However, as the
technical significance of PSA is getting increased, PSA has become a mandatory part of
Safety Analysis Reports and Periodic Safety Review. It is worthwhile to highlight the role
of emerging instrumentation and control (I&C) technologies including human–machine
interface (HMI) in developing more credible and realistic PSA models. Particularly, it is
expected that the information technology (i.e., software) embedded in digital I&C can
adjust over- and under conservatism in analyzing risk. In this study, authors proposed
the cases which would be able to significantly reduce risk if advanced I&C supported
by information technologies is applied. In regard, the several enabling techniques and
their effects are proposed. In order to improve the commercial competitiveness of NPPs,
the need of collaboration and synergetic outcome of I&C, HMI, and PSA should be
emphasized.
Keywords: nuclear power plant, instrumentation and control, human–machine interface, probabilistic safety
assessment, nuclear safety
Introduction
Though there are little differences in the regulatory infrastructures of all nuclear facilities in coun-
tries, probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has performed important roles in optimizing regulatory
resources while keeping nuclear safety higher. PSA has been evolved as a decision-making or
communicating tool by emphasizing technical vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants (NPPs) since
1970s. Risk-informed applications (RIAs) supported by PSA are particularly useful for allocating
limited resource while maintaining as higher standards as practically achievable. The nature of
PSA seeks the practical observation for reducing risk, so the PSA model by enabling engineers to
find the relative priority of accident scenarios, weak points in achieving accident prevention or
mitigation, and insights to improve those vulnerabilities. However, it should be noted that there
are still over- and under-conservative aspects in the procedures of developing a PSA model (Heo
et al., 2014). The regulatory authority noticed the statement of using PSAs for licensing process
of new nuclear reactors in 1989, but after the policy statement, differently from other countries
to actively promote the use of PSA, PSA has been supplementary and the RIAs of which the core
method is PSA were also carefully and limitedly exploited in the licensing process for NPPs of
South Korea. Since 1994, the utility has begun to voluntarily conduct PSAs for operating plants
while the legal requirement was not settled down. Recently, the technical position of PSA is being
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changed due to the consolidated regulatory needs. PSA has
become mandatory section of safety analysis reports (SARs) for
construction license and operating permit, and periodic safety
review (PSR) performed every 10 years, hence technical responsi-
bility of PSA is getting more important. This should be the results
of improved PSA models with less aleatory as well as epistemic
uncertainty during the past decades.
Meanwhile, in many countries, the computer-based opera-
tor support systems are deployed in NPPs for enhancing both
emergency operation capability and broader information support
during normal operation. The role and opportunity of instru-
mentation and control (I&C) including human–machine interface
(HMI) should be worthwhile to be highlighted in developing PSA
models. Particularly, it is expected that the information technol-
ogy (i.e., software) embedded in the digitalized I&C systems can
adjust over- and under conservatism in analyzing risk due to the
increased capability of human performance and the reduction of
data variation. The conventional PSA models are not fully and
comprehensively dealing with these factors.
In Section “Contribution of I&C in PSA Models,” authors
analyzed the results of PSA models for OPR-1000 (Korean
designed two-loop 1000MWe pressurized water reactor) and
proposed the possible accident scenarios which would be able to
significantly reduce risk if advanced information technologies are
applied. In order to technically backup these bottlenecks,
the enabling techniques such as failure rate uncertainty
reduction, component unavailability reduction, and human error
(omission and commission) reduction are described in Section
“Enabling Techniques,” which are representative achievements
published by authors’ previous researches. Finally, the necessary
recommendations and challenges to make synergetic outcome
among I&C, HMI, and PSA are discussed in Section “Conclusions
and Recommendations.”
Contribution of I&C in PSA Models
In this study, authors analyzed the results of PSA models for
OPR-1000 and found the accident scenarios which can signifi-
cantly reduce risk if advanced HMI technologies are applied. In
conventional PSAs, which mainly include the models of analog
I&C systems, I&C systems were considered as so called support
function providers. It means that the function of I&C systems was
understood and limited as safety signal generation or processing
for supporting front-line systems such as safety valves and pumps.
This concept of modeling was valid with simple analog processing
circuits of conventional NPPs. The role of I&C systems is chang-
ing. As broad and active deployment of digitalized I&C systems is
going on, this concept of modeling must be modified since they
are becoming an essential part of actual safety operation.
Though digitalized I&C systems were introduced due to the
issues of obsolescence, the digital technology seems slowly but
successfully matured and smeared into industries. In early 2000,
South Korea initiated and finalized a project to localize the major
digital I&C hardware through Korea Nuclear I&C System (so
called KNICS) Project. Once the digitalized I&C systems are
introduced, new technical chances opened by virtue of increased
computing capability, huge data warehouse, wide networks, and
so on. This trend ultimately aims at emphasizing the role of I&C,
HMI, and operators, which is the critical and never-ending con-
cern on nuclear safety. In conclusion, information technologies
can make step forward to enhance operators’ and/or maintenance
crews’ capability.
Meanwhile, the contribution of such digital technologies to
the enhanced safety of plants was not considered carefully, or
more precisely, their contribution could not be evaluated in a
quantitative manner. Table 1 shows the representative differences
between deterministic and probabilistic approaches.
In the deterministic approach, operator’s response is assumed
to be a certain fixed pattern. Therefore, there is nomethod for aug-
mented operator’s capability to be reflected. Even though human
error probability is considered in the probabilistic approach, the
operator’s behavior in digitalized environment is not fully under-
stood; so, we are not able to make sure whether the current PSA
model over- or under-estimates results. As an example, feed &
bleed operation in a PWR is the last mean of removing residual
heat from the core and its failure probability caused by human
error is around 23% because of short time, high stress level, and
consequence significant decision. Another critical safety opera-
tion, aggressive cool down, was also reported to have very high
failure probability (Jung et al., 2007). In a modern digital control
room, the human operator actions could not be decoupled from
the digital support systems which provide required processed
information in a timely manner and support execution of actions
with computerized procedures. Enhanced information systemand
support system would reduce the failure probability of some
safety-critical operations.
More aggressive utilization for risk reduction of NPPs comes
from online testing or monitoring of frontline safety components.
Automatic online monitoring and testing assures the success
of component actuation when its demand comes. The failure
TABLE 1 |Comparison between deterministic and probabilistic approaches.
Deterministic approach Probabilistic approach
Initiating events Limited to design basis
accidents (some beyond
design basis accidents
may be included)
All potentially important
events are included
Equipment reliability Single failure criterion is
postulated
Multiple failures and
common cause failures
are also considered
Operator behavior For t<T, no action is
postulated
(T= 10~30min)
Errors in diagnosis and
execution are considered
throughout the accident
sequence
For t>T, no operator
errors are postulated
Analysis Conservative
assumptions; orbest
estimate+ uncertainty
As realistic as possible
Use of results Comparison with absolute
acceptance criteria
Assess the safety in
relative manner
-Important accident
sequence
-Weak points in design
and procedures
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probability of a component which was tested 1 s ago is much lower
than that was tested 1month ago. Furthermore, this automatic
testing and monitoring technology provides much higher chance
of alternative operation path selection by operators to avoid the
use of failed components.
Intelligent operation procedure can be achieved by integrating
information and digital MHI technologies. Conventional oper-
ation procedures were developed in consideration of balancing
between the efficiency and simplicity under analog signal pro-
cessing circumstance. Technical support for safe operation from
various intelligent agents in modern NPPs could change the
emergency operation procedure itself.
Enabling Techniques
According to the aforementioned chapter, it is expected that con-
trolling risk can be managed in a better manner when advanced
information technologies are adopted. This chapter describes such
enabling techniques to support the technical gaps identified in the
PSA model.
Update of Initiating Event Frequency upon
Conditions
The initiating event (IE) frequency currently used in a PSAmodel
is a kind of averaged and lumped result during the whole plant
life-time. This idea came from the reliability theory. The well-
known bathtub curve representing component’s failure rate is
divided into three parts: infant failure, random failure, ware-out
failure. In order to avoid stochastic failures during the beginning
and the end periods, NPPs make trial runs and make use of the
preventive maintenance strategy. The failure rate of the compo-
nent in NPPs is, therefore, subjective to constant and random
pattern in the bathtub curves. However, a digital technology can
clarify two significant phenomena: one is the fluctuation of failure
rate even though it was assumed to be constant, and the other
is to detect the point of departure to wear-out failure interval.
Under the digitalized environment, the condition monitoring and
prognostic can track the trajectory of the failure rate even in the
constant and random failure rate interval. While there should be
benefits in using information technologies, its uncertaintymust be
a concern from the viewpoint of regulation. In regards,USNuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) concluded 14 technical issues
should be resolved for allowing the acceptance criteria (Hines
et al., 2008). Currently, condition monitoring and prognostic is
not generally accepted by regulatory authorities, it needs to be
noted that there was the case that a surveillance technique had
been officially approved for the helicopter rotor (Sikorsky Aircraft
Corp, 2015).
In fact, the IE frequency is obviously changing upon degrada-
tion and operational conditions. As the inspection and prognostic
techniques are getting advanced, it becomes possible to moni-
tor and forecast the detailed and accurate degradation status for
significant structures, systems, and components (SSCs). This can
properly update the IE frequencies to estimate actual core damage
frequency (CDF) representing the state of plant in time-dependent
manner.
To provide a case study, authors attempted to analyze a steam
generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident (Heo et al., 2014). Since
SGTR is a frequent and serious accident; the cracks in the tubes
are periodically detected and their growth rate is conservatively
estimated by physical or empirical models. It should be noted
that this procedure is a part of aging management, but not an
input for updating PSA models. On the other hand, NUREG/CR-
5750 (Poloski et al., 1998) provides the method to estimate the
IE frequency for SGTR. This frequency keeps constant during the
whole plant lifetime but can be regarded as a prior distribution
for Bayesian update. For instance, in the case of SGTR, the actual
incident resulting from stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and wear
damage was frequently reported in domestic and foreign papers.
For this reason, the structural and burst integrities of SG tubes
in static and transient conditions are required to be secured due
to the potential for radioactive contamination to the secondary
system caused by above damage modes (Kim et al., 2012a). For an
illustrative purpose, this study conducted time-dependent prob-
abilistic assessment for the outside axial crack using Probabilis-
tic Algorithm for Steam generator Tube Assessment (PASTA)
program (Kim et al., 2012b). The left side of Figure 1 shows
an example of burst probability with effective full power year
FIGURE 1 | Forecast for frequency of steam generator tube rupture.
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FIGURE 2 | Process of safety shutdown in OPR-1000.
(EFPY) with uncertainty bands for taking exploratory variables’
randomness.
In order to update the prior probability by this prognostic result,
we need to develop a likelihood function and Bayesian update
so that finally posterior probability for the IE can be calculated,
as shown on right side of Figure 1. It can be concluded that
this approach will reduce the uncertainty in estimating the IE
frequency in terms of reactor operating time, making the aging
based prediction of time-dependent CDF possible.
Automation of Safety Functions
The operator of a NPP must handle a large number of dynamic
information sources and reach a decision to achieve a system
goal efficiently and safely. Automation is one of the best ways
which reduce operator’s workload in main control room (MCR).
The automation must be implemented in a balanced manner with
manual safety actions for achieving minimum risk.
OPR-1000 has feed-and-bleed (F&B) operation procedure to
cope with an accident of which condition limits the cooling capa-
bility through steam generator. The F&B operation is the process
to remove the decay heat by evaporation of injected water. If
adequate heat removal capability through the steam generators is
not available, heat can be removed from the reactor coolant system
(RCS) by the F&B operation as shown in Figure 2. In an OPR-
1000, the F&B operation consists of the use of a safety depres-
surization system (SDS) and safety injection system (SIS). For the
F&Boperation, operatorsmustmanually open the SDS valves, and
a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) should be generated to
force the high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps to inject
coolant into the RCS. The F&B operation includes a number of
steps following the opening of the SDS valves before reaching a
shutdown cooling system (SCS) (Kim et al., 2014).
In order to initiate the F&B, the operators need to know the
plant status clearly and to have confidence that this operation
would be successful. This process takes considerable amount of
time, thus operator’s failure probability would be relatively high.
Operators may hesitate to initiate the F&B operation unless a
clear cue is provided because its initiation will result in the release
of radioactive coolant into containment structure. According to
safety analysis, operators have to initiate the F&B operation no
later than 23min after a reactor trip to prevent core damage
(Jung et al., 2007). Operators also consider the economic losses
before the initiation of F&B operation, because it would cause
the contamination of in-containment structure and components.
Moreover, operators have little experience to perform the F&B
operation. Automation of this process is expected to help oper-
ator’s F&B operation initiation.
While automation is apparently able to reduce human errors
so that it can make the CDF decreased, there are still challenges:
Enough process parameters must be measured, but a number of
parameters, such as the peak cladding temperature, are difficult
to be observed due to the absence of direct instrumentation.
To apply this strategy to actual plant operation, the method
for connection between automation and I&C systems should be
developed. To initiate the F&B operation, the automation gathers
the signals and generates the actuation signal for safety system
from I&C system. Operation strategy for automation should be
applied to conventional operation procedure properly and the
PSAmodel needs to be developed for estimating the effect of appli-
cation of automation. Furthermore, its liability when automa-
tion is failed seems very critical to make this concept practically
forward.
Component Unavailability Reduction through
Monitoring
There are many safety standby systems to mitigate consequences
of an accident in NPPs. The entire reliability of safety standby
systems greatly depends on the successful operation of some
standby component which is supposed to move mechanically
(Buchner and Fabian, 1994). Standby equipment does not pro-
vide any information for the perception of equipment condi-
tion because it is not in operation. Currently, periodic testing is
performed to check its abnormalities (Čepin and Mavko, 1997).
However, frequent testing can cause the increase of component
unavailability by leading aging effect. The maintenance bypass
process also makes component partially unavailable. It is desir-
able that some monitoring techniques be applied to monitor
abnormalities of standby equipment without actual operation of
component. When a failed state is verified through the moni-
toring technique, it can be maintained directly; thus, unavailable
time caused by a failed but overlooked state can be removed.
Figure 3 shows the monitoring concept for component unavail-
ability reduction. The monitoring method itself does not improve
the actual equipment availability but it makes immediate repair
possible to be conducted. When the immediate repair is assumed,
the unavailable time caused by a failed but overlooked state can be
removed.
To set the practical method, first of all, important components
should be identified and their dominant failure modes should be
determined. Then the signal accuracy and the logic for failure
judgment should be considered when an actual sensing technique
is applied. Two problemsmay arise in terms of signal accuracy and
failure judgment. When a sensing device cannot detect failures or
a failure is ignored, it is the same case the component is not mon-
itored. Alternatively, when a sensing device generates the wrong
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FIGURE 3 | Component unavailability reduction through monitoring.
alarm, confusion and unnecessary testing will occur resulting in
increase of component unavailability. Therefore, accurate failure
detection is one of the key challenges for monitoring of safety
critical standby component.
On-line monitoring for standby systems can be equivalently
considered as the super-frequently periodic tests, so this technique
can greatly reduce the unavailability between testing intervals in
the basic events.
State-of-the-art Techniques for Substantial
Reduction of Human Errors
In NPPs, the systems are controlled by human operators and I&C
systems provide a major source of information to MCR operators
(Kim and Seong, 2006). In this environment, the errors caused
by human operators can lead unwanted problems. It was found
that human error probability has about 62% contribution to CDF
(Gertman et al., 2002). Among the solutions to reduce human
errors, a new framework for human reliability analysis (HRA)
method to predict human error probabilities (HEPs) to provide
HEP to PSA is addressed in detail as follows.
The operation environment of MCRs in NPPs has changed
with the adoption of new human–system interfaces that are based
on computer-based technologies. Among the many features of
advanced MCRs, soft controls are the particularly important fea-
ture because of the operation actions in NPP. In order to develop
the framework for the HRA method in soft control environ-
ment, task analysis should be performed to identify human error
modes. Moreover, dependency among subtasks is considered
by modifying the determination of levels of dependency in the
Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) model.
In the proposed model, a success path is considered to calculate
soft control execution HEP with consideration of dependency
between two subtasks. A database for inputs to the general HEP
equation, such as nominal HEPs and recovery failure probabil-
ities, is developed and applied to estimate HEPs (Jang et al.,
2014).
Many statistical results from safety reports tell that training
operators for the technical and non-technical skills can prevent
many types of human errors. In author’s previous study, an effec-
tive training of operation teams in the form of integrated model
of technical and non-technical skills was suggested. Technical
skills were indirectly measured by situation awareness (SA) which
was closely related to the level of knowledge. SA was structured
by production rules (WHEN-THEN logic) and quantified by
Bayesian inference. Four non-technical skills were summarized
and selected from researches of other safety critical industries:
leadership, communication, SA, and decision making skills. The
selected skills were quantified based on the representative factors
(Yim et al., 2013).
Evaluation on Human Error Impact during
Test/Maintenance
While automation is the aid for operators, proactive simulation
technique can be the aid for test/maintenance crews in NPPs.
It is also possible to reduce human errors related with not only
operation but also test/maintenance using information technol-
ogy. Simulation techniques help maintenance crews to recognize
which task is the most critical in increasing CDF before they
perform their missions.
The framework, shown in Figure 4, was proposed for esti-
mation of qualitative and quantitative consequences of human
errors that occur during maintenance tasks (Heo and Park, 2010).
One of the remedies for unexpected reactor shutdowns may be a
systematic tool designed to warn potential hazards arising from a
given maintenance tasks, taking into account human error modes
in a proactive manner, in terms of risk and/or loss of electrical
power. The entire framework that we established is composed
of four components: (1) the human-error analyzer to connect
possible failure modes resulting from human errors with other
estimators, (2) the frequency estimator to quantify the occurrence
of maintenance-related failure modes, (3) the risk estimator to
determine minimal cutsets and to compute the variation of the
CDF using the fault tree analysis and turbine cycle simulation,
and (4) the derate estimator to determine the electrical power loss
under abnormal plant configurations caused by human error. The
final result is characterized by a cost metric that can be used for
decision-making possibly resulting in revisions of procedures or
task modifications. This idea is more useful for test/maintenance
than operation because the simulation technique can be fully used
with enough time, which is not practical in emergency operational
scenarios.
The conventional PSA models include limited number of
human errors during test/maintenance. This method can reduce
the uncertainty in PSAmodel and enhance its use from a different
perspective. It provides an efficient mean to address the effect
of test/maintenance human errors in a systematic way. Analysis
of human errors during test/maintenance with aid of simulation
technique can contribute to the reduction of such errors and result
in enhanced plant safety.
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FIGURE 4 | Framework for evaluating the effects of maintenance-related human errors.
Conclusions and Recommendations
This paper emphasizes on the contribution of I&C or information
technologies beyond the conventional I&C systems in the field of
nuclear safety. Particularly, the digitalized systems are being intro-
duced to recent NPPs and advanced information technologies
are expected to take high responsibility of safety and performing
desire functions with high reliability. However, to gain confidence,
risk contribution of such technologies should be quantified and
fully counted with respect to nuclear safety.
Recently, the new policy statement for PSA and RIA has been
announced in South Korea, and this should act as a driving-
force of the new and emerging HMI researches. In order to
keep the strong motivation and feasibility of such approaches,
the methods to make up weakness as well as to boost strength
should be supported. From this viewpoint, the benefit of advanced
HMI technology can be explained by the reduction of risk
in a PSA model. However, there are still lots of challenges:
software reliability, quality and quantity of sensing elements,
viable monitoring techniques, and inherent uncertainty in sta-
tistical approaches and the likewise. These issues should also be
resolved to promote the use of advanced HMI technologies in
future NPPs.
In South Korea, major digital I&C hardware were successfully
developed through KNICS Project, started in early 2000. Now
it is time to step forward in software R&D to make synergetic
outcomes such that it can be integrated with the digital I&C hard-
ware. Authors expect that this paper would help the researchers
and R&D policy managers to recognize issues for promoting safer
nuclear energy.
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